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Abstract
This article points out mutual authentication and key exchange protocols for low power wireless communications (called
MAKEP) due to Wong and Chan is insecure against forgery attacks, namely an intruder can construct a valid response to pass the
client authentication phase in the future runs of MAKEP.
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1. Introduction
Wong and Chan [3] present two efﬁcient mutual authentication and key exchange protocols (MAKEPs) which
it is establishing secure communications between a low-power wireless (client) and a powerful base station (server)
under different system requirement. The good idea of protocols is that making the client do lesser computation with
low-power than server under unchanging the security of the protocols. However, the MAKEP is not security as they
showed. And, there have been some articles to point out the weaknesses of the protocol. In [2], Shim described
“unknown key-share” attacks on the two protocols. An unknown key-share attack on an authenticated key agreement
protocol is an attack where by an entity A ends up believing it shares a key with an entity, and although this is in fact
the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with another entity E  A. Ng and Mitchell [1] also gave
a variety unknown key-share attack and described weakness in the protocol. In [4], Yang and Chen present a replay
attack on the Linear MAKEP. Changing a previously intercepted response, an intruder can be testiﬁed that he is an
authorized user. An improvement is presented and a formal proof on the security is also given. In this paper, we will
point out a new weakness for MAKEP. Using the characteristic of the XOR operation, if attacker Eve wants to fake
a message to Bob, she does not need to guess a password or challenge discrete logarithm problem. The rest of the
article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Wong-Chan’s Linear MAKEP Scheme. In Section 3, we ﬁrst show
the characteristic of the XOR operation, then we point out the weakness of the Linear MAKEP and out attack. Section
4 concludes this paper.
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2. Review of Wong-Chan’s Linear MAKEP Scheme
Let p be a prime such that the discrete log problem in Zp is intractable. Let g ∈ Z∗p be a primitive element.
Let A denote a client entity, B denote a server entity, ε() denote an encryption function, and TA denote the trusted
authority. S KB is the secret key of B, the corresponding public key is PKB. A randomly selects a series of integers
(a1, a2, · · · , a2i−1, a2i, · · · , a2n−1, a2n) ∈ Zp−1 as her secret keys. The pair (a2i−1, a2i) serves as the secret key of the i-th
run of the Linear MAKEP. The corresponding public key is (ga2i−1 , ga2i) ∈ Z∗p. The following steps show the details of
protocol.
1. At the i-th run of the LinearMAKEP, A constructs a certiﬁcate given byCertiA = 〈IDA, ga2i−1 , ga2i , S igTA(IDA, ga2i−1 , ga2i)〉
and sends it to B.
Where S igTA(IDA, ga2i−1 , ga2i) is the signature for public key pair (ga2i−1 , ga2i) obtained from the TA during the idle
times, IDA is the identiﬁcation of A.
2. After verifying the validity of the certiﬁcate, B sends back a nonce rB.
3. After receiving the nonce rB, A does the following:
1) Selects a nonce rA and computes
x = εPKB(rA). (1)
2) Computes
y = a2i−1(x ⊕ rB) + a2i (mod p − 1). (2)
3) Computes session key
σ = rA ⊕ y, (3)
sends x and y to B.
4. When B receives x and y, he determines whether
(ga2i−1 )x⊕rBga2i ≡ gy (mod p). (4)
If equation (4) holds, B decrypts x to recover rA, computes the new session key σ = rA ⊕ y and sends εσ(x) back to
A; otherwise, B rejects the communication and the protocol halts. The client authentication is accomplished by the
challenge-response pair (rB, (x, y)) in step 2 and 3. The server authentication is achieved by the challenge-response
pair (x, εσ(x)) in step 3 and 4.
3. Our Attack
In this section, we will point out a weakness for linear MAKEP scheme. If attacker Eve wants to fake a message to
Bob, she does not need to guess a password or challenge discrete logarithm problem. Even if linear MAKEP scheme
used bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation to resist algebra attack, but it exist a leak which the number system of
two’s complement is the most common method of representing on computer. In the follow, we describe the practical
issue that two variables do bitwise exclusive-or operation problem.
Notation:
⊕: express bitwise exclusive-or operation.
()10: express decimal number system.
()2: express binary number system.
[Pr]: express probability.
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(PKB , SKB){a1, . . . , a2i−1, a2i, . . . , a2n} ∈R Zp−1
{ga1 , ga2i−1 , ga2i−1 , . . . , ga2n} ∈ Z∗p
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CertiA
rA ← {0, 1}
k
x = εPKB (rA)
y = a2i−1(x⊕ rB) + a2i (mod p− 1)
σ = rA ⊕ y
σ = rA ⊕ y
(ga2i−1)x⊕rB
?
≡ gy (mod p)
rB ∈R Zp−1
Figure 1: Wong-Chan’s Linear MAKEP
3.1. The XOR operation
The XOR operation is a common component in design of digital logical. It is used on adder, cryptosystem or other
application. We described the XOR boolean algebra as below. There are some Axioms known of deﬁnition:
0 = 1 (5)
1 = 0 (6)
A ⊕ 1 = A (7)
A ⊕ 0 = A (8)
A ⊕ A = 0 (9)
A ⊕ A = 1 (10)
A ⊕ B = AB + AB (11)
Theorem 1. Let ⊕ be an operation on the set X. It is called commutative if A ⊕ B=B ⊕ A for all A, B ∈ X.
Proof. According to equation (7), A ⊕ B = AB + AB (known deﬁnition)
B ⊕ A = BA + BA, therefore AB + AB = BA + BA.
We obtain A ⊕ B=B ⊕ A.
Thus, the XOR matches commutative law.
Theorem 2. Let ⊕ be an operation in the set X. It is called associative if (A ⊕ B) ⊕C = A ⊕ (B ⊕C) for all A, B ∈ X.
Proof. (A ⊕ B) ⊕C = (AB + AB) ⊕C.
= (AB + AB) ⊕C.
= (AB + AB)C + (AB + AB)C.
= (AB + AB)C + (AB + AB)C.
= (AB) · (AB)C + ABC + AB ·C.
= (A + B)(A + B)C + ABC + AB ·C.
= AAC + ABC + B · AC + BBC + ABC + AB ·C.
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AA = 0 and BB = 0.
= ABC + B · AC + ABC + AB ·C.
Computing A ⊕ (B ⊕C).
= A ⊕ (B ⊕C) = A ⊕ (BC + BC).
= A(BC + BC) + A(BC + BC).
= ABC + ABC + A(BC) · (BC).
= A · BC + ABC + A(B +C)(B +C).
= A · BC + ABC + ABB + AB ·C + ACB + ACC.
= A · BC + ABC + ABC + AC · B.
∵ ABC + B · AC + ABC + AB ·C = A · BC + ABC + ABC + AC · B.
∴ (A ⊕ B) ⊕C = A ⊕ (B ⊕C).
Here, the XOR matches associative law.
Theorem 3. Let A = B, A ⊕ B =
bits
︷︸︸︷
0000 . . . 0000.
Proof. According to Axiom (5), A ⊕ A = 0, therefore A ⊕ B =
bits
︷︸︸︷
0000 . . . 0000.
Theorem 4. If A, B are odd numbers, (A) ⊕ (−A) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
1111 . . . 1110,
(B) ⊕ (−B) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
1111 . . . 1110. (A ⊕ B) = (−A ⊕ −B).
Proof. According to theorem 3, if A = B, then (A ⊕ B) ⊕ (−A ⊕ −B)
=
bits
︷︸︸︷
0000 . . . 0000. From theorem 1 commutative law and theorem 2 associative law, we rewrite this equation (A ⊕ B) ⊕
(−A ⊕ −B) = (A ⊕ −A) ⊕ (B ⊕ −B).
According to theorem 4, A ⊕ −A = B ⊕ −B.
From theorem 3, (A ⊕ B) ⊕ (−A ⊕ −B) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
0000 . . . 0000.
∴ (A ⊕ B) = (−A ⊕ −B).
Theorem 5. If A, B are even numbers, 4 | A, B and 8  A, B. (A ⊕ B) = (−A ⊕ −B).
Proof. We assume A and B are n bits numbers, when 4 | A and 8  A,
A =
(bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 100. When 4 | B and 8  B, B =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 100.
(A ⊕ B) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 000.
Assume −A =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 100, and −B =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 100.
(−A ⊕ −B) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 000 .
(A ⊕ B) ⊕ (−A ⊕ −B) =
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 000 ⊕
bits
︷︸︸︷
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ . . . 000= 0.
∴ (A ⊕ B) = (−A ⊕ −B).
3.2. The weakness of linear MAKEP
The two’s complement of a binary number is deﬁned as the value obtained by subtracting the number from a
large power of two (speciﬁcally, from 2N for an N-bit two’s complement). A two’s-complement system or two’s-
complement arithmetic is a system in which negative numbers are represented by the two’s complement of the absolute
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value; this system is the most common method of representing signed integers on computers.
We analyze the probability of the x and the rB.
(x, rB)⇒
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
both odd numbers, the [Pr = 14 ].
one odd and even numbers, [Pr = 12 ].
both even numbers, the [Pr = 14 ].
For Example:
(193)10 = (11000001)2
(249)10 = (11111001)2
(193)10 XOR (249)10 = (00111000)2
(193)10 ⊕ (249)10 = (56)10
(−193)10 = (1111111100111111)2
(−249)10 = (1111111100000111)2
(−193)10 ⊕ (−249)10 = (0000000000111000)2
(−193)10 ⊕ (−249)10 = (56)10
3.3. Our attack method
The attacker Eve can easy to fake the valid parameters (x, rB) where x ⊕ rB ?= (−x) ⊕ (−rB). She do follow steps:
Step 1. Eve sets x′ = −x.
Step 2. Eve sets r′B = −rB.
Step 3. Eve computes
y ≡ a2i−1(−x ⊕ −rB) + a2i (mod p − 1). (12)
A E B
CertiA
CertiA
rBr′B
x, y x
′, y
εσ(x)εσ(x)
Figure 2: The vulnerability of Linear MAKEP
From theorem 3 to theorem 5, we obtain “x ⊕ rB = x′ ⊕ r′B” if x and rB are both odd numbers or even numbers where
they matches speciﬁed rules. Now, it clearly describes from equation (12) and ﬁgure 2. The attacker Eve may forge
successful for her attack.
4. Conclusion
There is more difﬁcult to prevent multiplicative property of algebra attack. Using XOR operation is efﬁciency to
resist this attack. However, according to our analysis, the Wong-Chan’s linear MAKEP scheme is still insecure.
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